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Introduction: Legitimacy and Technology
If elected, not by the majority of those who vote, but confirmed by
a constitutionally mandated process, can a candidate be the legitimate
winner?  If a contender wins a race run according to rules set down by
an independent judiciary that nonetheless invalidates votes fairly cast, is
his victory legitimate?  Does the failure of the U.S. Supreme Court to tele-
vise argument over the Florida ballot recount during the recent election
or to sign its opinion in the case de-legitimize the Court’s authority
because it refuses to expose itself to public scrutiny?  Alternatively, does
the secrecy enhance the legitimacy of the Court by imbuing it with an air
of mysterious power?  By „legitimate“ we are inquiring about the accep-
tance of an institution’s authority and its potential eff e c t i v e n e s s .
Without legitimacy, a political leader will not be able to push his vision
through in the policymaking process and might as well not have been
elected (if he ever was).  None of this, however, would have been an
issue in the recent U.S. election, if the „technology“ used for voting - the
dimpled, hanging and pregnant „chads“ - were reliable.  Furthermore, if
the newer technologies, television and the Internet, had not called a Gore
victory at 8:03 pm on Election Night, voters might not have left the pol-
ling booth lines and would have cast decisive ballots, instead.   Critical
is the legal battle over whether hand-counting ballots is the appropriate
technology to elect a president in the twenty-first century.  In the end, as
protests over the disenfranchising of voters, the inconsistency between
the popular and the Electoral College votes and bipartisan corruption
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grow fainter, the repeatedly televised image of George W. Bush cloaks
him with the mantle of authority and legitimacy.  „Indecision 2000“ in
the United States, as it has come to be known, unmistakably highlights
the impact of technology on the perception of political legitimacy and
the legitimizing of specific forms of democratic political culture.
Two extreme opinions - one that the Internet is a boon to
democracy and the other that it is destructive of democracy - have beco-
me commonplace rhetoric today.   In attempting to debunk both the
cyber-utopian and the neo-Luddite view, this essay argues that neither of
these are wholly true because what we actually perceive is the process of
political de-legitimation caused by the spread of the Internet.  Because
technology defines the range of possibilities for how government com-
municates with its citizens and how they communicate with each other,
when those possibilities change, the perception of the democratic quali-
ty of our institutions changes, too.  The new communications technolo-
gies, whose impact outstrips that of prior innovations, act as a mirror,
exposing the inadequacy of our current political institutions that pre-
suppose a now-outdated technological reality. As such, many perceive
them as a threat to democratic life and legitimacy.  This is for three rea-
sons: First, global network technologies respect no legal boundaries and
therefore undermine the legitimacy and enforcement of national law,
whose rule undergirds and defines the essence of democracy.  Second,
the Internet, because it is largely dominated by English-language content
and web sites from the United States, is seen as eroding cultural diffe-
rence and localism and giving preference to a new set of global com-
mercial and consumerist values that thrive on the Net.  Third, the priva-
te and privatizing environment of the Internet is perceived to be dest-
roying public democracy and public space.  I will argue that the chan-
ging technological landscape is undermining the perceived legitimacy of
our democratic institutions and is a portent for change.  But it is as yet
3
unclear whether that change will be for the better or worse.  If technolo-
gy’s democratic potential (instead of its destructive potential) is to be ful-
filled, it re q u i res a proactive policy designed expressly to further
democratic and civic goals.
What is Legitimacy?
Max Weber wrote that the effectiveness of any form of political aut-
hority, whether charismatic or democratic, relies on a degree of volun-
tary subjugation by the constituency.  Its willingness to submit to autho-
rity depends, in turn, upon whether that authority is perceived as legiti-
mate.   Technology changes how we interact with and perceive our
world and what we understand to be the range of legitimate political
choices that comprise democracy and its constituent formal values of
equality, justice and fairness, rule of law and popular sovereignty and
informal norms of respect for local customs and culture.2 The technolo-
gical and geographical reality of the small town where information can
be spread by word-of-mouth and broadside justified the town meeting
as a legitimate form of democracy.  The legitimacy of our contemporary
representative democracy and its bureaucracy grew out of the technolo-
gical reality of imperfect information and limited communication across
vast distance mediated by a handful of centralized institutions.  The
technology of one-way television reinforced this notion of a passive elec-
torate and its elected expert proxy representatives as an adequately
democratic institution.
The characteristics of the new communications technologies are
fundamentally different and create political dislocations in contempor-
ary democratic culture.  Communication is essential to how we organize
ourselves politically.  The material nature of communications is chan-
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ging.  It has become a commonplace to acknowledge that the Internet
has revolutionized every aspect of socioeconomic life in large parts of the
world and indirectly impacted even the most distant societies.   Now, as
perhaps never before, the perception that we are living in a revolutio-
nary period of fundamental change reigns.3 When the Drudge Report,
an exclusively on-line political gossip column, receives more „hits“ than
the Republican or Democratic party web sites during those parties’
national conventions, it is obvious that the Internet is changing the natu-
re of our democratic political culture.4 The spread of these Information
and Communications Technologies (ICTs) is exponentially greater than
any prior invention.  It has only taken five years for e-mail to reach 50
million people and less than 2 years for the World Wide Web to reach 10
million people.
The Special Features of the New Technologies
New technologies, in particular, (1) the speed and ease with which
networks connect people regardless of physical geography or proximity,
(2) the way they facilitate access to and manipulation of vast quantities
of data, and (3) the power they impart to the individual citizen to com-
municate from one-to-one and one-to-many at no marginal cost, upend
the stranglehold of traditional information arbiters over the machinery
of public perception and the conduits of political communication.  These
are not mere toys or tools but communications technologies that define
an alternate reality with palpable architectural contours and make pos-
sible new forms of conversation and dialogue. Therefore, it has become
commonplace to question whether this innovation is a threat to our
democracy, slowly eroding the political terrain, reshaping its institutio-
nal and cultural contours as television did in the last generation.
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Though on the one hand we celebrate (prematurely) the spread of
democratic ideals, values and institutions and offer up explanations for
the „end of ideology“ as a by-product of global capitalism, the impact of
the new communications technology on the legitimacy of these
democratic principles and institutions is uncertain.  The promise of
unlimited, even excessive, communication and information flows raises
the question: how does the Internet, as a global communications medi-
um, impact the legitimacy of our current democratic institutions?
Focusing on the question of legitimacy, in particular, is shorthand to
address the interrelationship between these communications media and
the shaping of public perception.  Empirically, simple observation shows
that actual political change has not been as dramatic as cyber-utopians
would have predicted a decade ago.  Rather the Internet has changed the
perception of our political processes.  That affects their legitimacy and,
in turn, forges the will for gradual political change.
The Internet and the Perception of Political Change
There are certain key realities that catalyze the impression that the
Internet is somehow dangerous or disruptive of political life.  The
Internet (1) has become a significant alternative to the traditional mass
media and a new source of interest articulation, often on controversial
subjects given less coverage elsewhere, including sexuality, personal
health and medicine, relationships and political gossip and scandal; (2)
enjoys its greatest appeal among young people, who are comfortable
with technology, but feel politically disfranchised or disinterested, and
since 2000, also among women and people of color (in the United
States);5 (3) demonstrates the power of decentralized communications to
disperse power downward, away from government, to loosely conjoined
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groups, organizing and empowering themselves via computer net-
works; and, finally, (4) does not depend for its success on the endorse-
ment of organized political institutions or their elites.  In fact, the ability
of applications such as Napster or digital encryption to circumvent and
undermine establishment institutions, contribute to their popular appe-
al and the perception that they constitute a political threat.  
Whereas these ICTs are perceived (by some) as a threat to the poli-
tical and social status quo, they present less of an immediate danger to
our political system, which is still fundamentally stable and legitimate.
Rather, these revolutionary technological developments threaten, not
democracy itself, but the specific institutions that make up the political
culture in those nations where the technologies have had their profoun-
dest penetration.   There is no doubt that the Net is changing how citi-
zens view and participate in the political process (e.g. electronic voting),
how government interacts with citizens (e.g. electronic service delivery
and tax collection) and the potential for citizens to engage with each
other (e.g. Net action and organizing).  Dick Morris, the chief strategist
for President Bill Clinton’s 1996 campaign and president of Vote.com
predicts, for example, that new technology will elevate direct democra-
tic processes as legitimate: „there will be daily referenda ... the Internet
will be the Congress. The Internet will be the Parliament. The Internet
will be the election.“6 Though this prediction is both extreme and unli-
kely, the remark goes to the heart of the perception that new technologies
undermine the stability of political institutions designed around the for-
mal and informal assumptions that people and information cannot be
easily connected.
There is nothing inherently anti-democratic about these technolo-
gies.  Though they are disruptive of the old way of doing things, if any-
thing, they have the potential to enhance the quality of democracy even
as they threaten its current institutional embodiments.   Used democra-
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tically to further the ends of democracy, these ICTs could improve the
rule of reasoned law, popular participation and engagement in the poli-
tical process, the development of a more robust and deliberative public
sphere and increased transparency between governing and governed.
They have the potential to help overcome the democratic deficit that
derives, in part, from a growing gap between increasingly homogenized
global or national institutions and local values, culture and engagement.
The Internet: A Threat to Democracy?
There are three primary reasons why technology is perceived as a
threat to democratic life and legitimacy.7 First, global network technolo-
gies respect no legal boundaries and therefore undermine the legitimacy
and enforcement of national law, whose rule undergirds and defines the
essence of democracy.  Second, the Internet, because it is largely domi-
nated by English-language content and web sites from the United States,
is seen as eroding cultural difference and localism and giving preference
to a new set of global commercial and consumerist values that thrive on
the Net.  Finally, the private and privatizing environment of the Internet
is perceived to be destroying public democracy.   Whereas the telecom-
munications conduits that carry Internet traffic are, for the most part,
subject to common carrier requirements of non-discrimination (although
this is not securely the case for Internet via cable or WebTV), the Internet
is not a public technology.  Both the backbone (at least in the United
States) and the web sites that this infrastructure carries are private.
Despite the rapid rise and fall of thousands of e-commerce companies,
there is still (comparatively) almost no political life on the Net.  It is only
in its infancy and growth is stunted. There are no public parks or public
spaces in cyberspace, which suffers from a democratic deficit dispropor-
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tionate to the number of users and the time they spend there.  Web sites
are designed to improve commerce and hence are increasingly customi-
zed to target the individual.  This individualization and privatization on
the World Wide Web, the interface by which most people use the
Internet, is a radical move away from the origins of the Internet as a com-
munications and networking technology and eviscerate any notion of
public media, shared cultural experience, public decision making and
responsibility that are at the foundation of democratic life.
Technology Respects No Legal Boundaries
It has become an irrefragable truth that network technologies, with
their power to connect people around the planet or around the block,
increasingly respect no national laws.  The question is whether this sug-
gests that they might destroy and destabilize the legitimacy of our
democratic system.  The Internet levels the effectiveness of the instituti-
ons we consider to be legitimate at enforcing the law.  There are count-
less examples of cyber-crimes that are perpetrated against victims in one
country by out-of-reach criminals in another, operating via servers and
networks in a third country.  Law enforcement in Germany, for example,
is powerless to get at neo-Nazis operating Web sites out of the United
States or Canada.  Apprehending purveyors of illegal offshore porno-
graphy or gambling operations is a disproportionate effort to the reward.
There has always been cross-border criminal activity, but the scope and
speed of the Internet magnify the gravity of the problem.  For those who
consider that Napster, Gnutella and other file sharing programs that per-
mit users to swap and trade music and other copyrighted material
should be outlawed, the question remains if such a law could ever be
enforced.  The failure of anti-Internet indecency legislation in the United
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States resulted, not only from the fact that „indecency“ covered too
broad a swathe of language and risked infringing on constitutionally
permissible speech, but that such a law could never be equitably enfor-
ced.  The Internet empowers users to transmit information at such rapid
speeds, often securely encrypted, so that it becomes impossible to iden-
tify and, therefore, apprehend the sender.
It is not only a question of undermining the police power to physi-
cally capture a reasonable percentage of criminal suspects, but of which
jurisdictional rules to apply.  To be democratically legitimate, laws must
be applied with fairness, equanimity and due process, and not by fiat or
discretion.  When a couple in California uploads adult material to an
e l e c t ronic bulletin board (BBS) in California - material which in
California would not be considered obscene - and those images are
downloaded by a postal inspector in Tennessee, it is not clear that the
standards of Tennessee should apply, rather than those of California.8
Computer networks render transactions between citizens of different
states and different countries routine and commonplace and lay bare the
inconsistencies in the national systems of regulation that are differently
applied to the same technology.  This is a far-reaching and serious pro-
blem that touches on legal issues as diverse as electronic signatures and
contracts, advertising and consumer protection rules, gaming and gam-
bling, fraud and drug dealing.  To circumvent a European ban on adver-
tising prescription drugs,9 multinational pharmaceutical conglomerates
have set up informational Web sites on servers in the United States,
where such advertising is regulated (to some extent) but not restricted,
in an effort to reach consumers worldwide.  There is no consensus on
whether this practice constitutes primarily a dangerous skirting of
European consumer protection rules or a satisfaction of the consumer’s
right to know and to information.   In an attempt to begin to create a
more cohesive and consistent regulatory framework, the European
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Union recently enacted a Directive on Electronic Commerce,10 which sets
forth jurisdictional rules to be applied in electronic transactions.  The
Directive, for reasons beyond the scope of this paper, has provoked con-
troversy.  But its enactment highlights the urgency of the problem.11
Perhaps the more significant impact on the political perception of
new technology is the inconsistent application of public and constitutio-
nal law engendered by transnational networks.  Because constitutional
law, in particular, defines and expresses fundamental national values,
including the right to free speech and movement, physical, informatio-
nal and communications privacy, the inability to apply it consistently in
cyberspace challenges the constitutional basis of our democracies and
the deep-seated values on which they rest.
One of the most vexing and politically urgent conundrums that
illustrate the pressure on our political culture created by the Internet is
content regulation and the protection of children.12 The proliferation -
or rather the perception of a proliferation - of pornographic, obscene,
violent and racist content on the Internet has sparked pressure on politi-
cians to regulate content on the Net for the protection of minors who, in
many cases, have better access to and facility with technology than their
parents.   The political desire to be on the „right“ side of pornography
and children adds urgency and some degree of hysteria to a genuine pro-
blem for which the solution may be legal, technological, self-regulatory,
educational or a combination of the above.  But the difficulty of any form
of speech regulation, especially regulation with transnational implicati-
ons, is that each nation interprets „free speech“ in the context of its par-
ticular cultural and historical background.   Within countries, each regi-
on, locality and individual family has differing views on what constitu-
tes „harmful“ content.  A Halloween Web site may be fun and educatio-
nal to one set of parents and blasphemous and heretical to another.
Frank medical information about AIDS or sexually transmitted disease
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might be appropriate for a 14-year old in New York or Frankfurt and
never appropriate for the children of parents in countries where tradi-
tional religious values dominate, such as in Iran or Saudi Arabia.
Whereas Mein Kampf might make required, albeit repulsive, reading to
a student in California, German educators might consider the book to be
psychologically dangerous as well as illegal.  In just such a recent case,
Yahoo!, the US-based Internet company, in response to international
pressure and the judgment of a French court, has agreed to ban the sale
of Nazi propaganda and memorabilia from its auction and shopping
sites, including its English language sites in the U.S.13 Yet such a restric-
tion, if imposed by the government or courts in the United States, would
contravene the First Amendment.  The intractable puzzle of how to
reconcile and harmonize entrenched and different traditions calls the
laws themselves into question.  Is the First Amendment jurisprudence of
unfettered liberty the benchmark for evaluating content on a global com-
munications network that passes through countries with very different
traditions of free expression?  By contrast, are laws conceived and writ-
ten for a European audience with access to a limited number of televisi-
on channels, applicable when spectrum is unlimited and streaming
video can be delivered via the Internet?
At the same time, the inefficacy of current regulations is highligh-
ted not only by the globalization brought on by network technologies
but by the individualization they make possible.  Why is national regu-
lation, let alone supranational regulation, of Internet content necessary
when the tools exist (i.e. software filters) to allow each family to make,
implement and enforce its own decisions about appropriate and harmful
content for the children in the family.   Individual preferences can be
maximized more effectively than ever before with the utilization of the
appropriate tools.  With a mere point-and-click I can decide and let the
computer execute my decision to accept incoming mail, attachments to
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that mail, mail containing or not containing certain key words, instant
messages or invitations to chat rooms.  With this technology, I can also
impose my decision like law on other members of the household using
my machine or on employees of my company by means of a proxy ser-
ver.
The greater the level of Internet connectivity and usage globally,
the more pressing becomes the perception that national laws and their
enforcement by national governments have become an outdated and
illegitimate phenomenon.  Without the legitimacy of our procedural and
substantive legal system, the foundations of democratic culture are cal-
led into question.
Global Technology Erodes Cultural Differences
Not unrelated, yet distinct from the obsolescence of national law, is
the perceived threat to democracy from the apparent erosion of national
and local culture by global networks.   It is essential to be aware that the
definition of „values“ is an extremely complex question, highlighting
again the fact that it is perception of value erosion that is at issue.
Because of the awesome power of the Internet’s communications proto-
cols to connect citizens in a web of information sharing and exchange,
regardless of the hardware platform they use, it also glosses over cultu-
ral difference and „collides with existing values“14 to produce, at the
very least, a process of value change.  Though the Internet opens the
door for global dialogue, it potentially destroys localism in favor of glo-
balization, magnifying the familiar coca-colonization problem a thou-
sand-fold. One could argue that the Internet, because it places the pri-
macy on speed, 15 moves at the pace and embodies the values of the
active „American personality“16 and its culture of youth and that it does
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not value deliberative traditions.  This argument leads to the criticism
that the Internet exports particularly American values and imposes them
on those who use the Internet.  I would argue, instead, that the Internet
- or rather the global capital flows that it facilitates — exports, not
American values per se, but the commercial and privatizing value of e-
commerce that has become so prevalent.  These dot.com cultural values
of commercial globalization are antithetical to and corrosive of the legi-
timate cultural traditions that define political cultures around the world.
The Internet is without an established cultural history and without any
organic political culture.  The absence of cultural baggage or entrenched
cronyism and the primacy of openness and sharing might bode well for
democratic values.  There are those who point to the number of commu-
nications channels available via the Internet to celebrate the diversity
that it enables.  But that hope - the promise of the Net’s democratic
potential - must not distract attention from the value-laden nature of all
technology.  The Internet and computer are not inherently anti-democra-
tic or democratic.  Rather their specific characteristics imply the potenti-
al, in this case, to be one or the other or both.  This goes deeper than the
question of how many Web sites are in English or how many sell French
instead of American goods.  The choices we make about the develop-
ment of our technology, the interface we give it to interact with the world
and the laws by which we regulate access to it, are all value decisions
that are expressed in the technology.  Many of these choices are not made
by democratically accountable authorities, a citizen body or even by the
individual user, but rather by technology companies.
When you go to a Web page and cannot access it, the screen flashes
the ever-frustrating „404 Not-Found“ error. After pounding our fists, we
move on, assuming that this is the „way it has to be.“  But it does not.
404 Not Found could mean the link is old or that access has been
blocked.  Either way this process does not respect the democratic value
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of transparency. At best, it reflects the laziness of a programmer. At
worst, it is a deliberate attempt to obfuscate the truth and mask it behind
the opaque wall of technological expertise.  Because understanding these
new technologies is a skill possessed by the few, rather than the many,
the techno-elite can impose its own values on consumers of Internet ser-
vices.  It is because the cultural and political power of those who control
technology has come to be recognized and feared that the anti-trust batt-
le in the United States over Microsoft’s packaging of Internet Explorer
with the Windows operating system has been so contentious.  As cyber-
space increasingly becomes the locus of political interaction and socia-
lization, the owners of the networks and those who design its front-end
interfaces become increasingly responsible for the political consciousn-
ess and civic education of the next generation.  On a less subtle level,
legal inconsistencies between the regulation of telecommunications net-
works, cable and broadcast, allow the corporations who own the net-
works to exploit loopholes to their advantage and to the detriment of
local values.17
One of the thorniest examples of the conflict between the ethic of
the Internet and local values has been the contentious issue of personal
privacy on the Web.   The privacy dilemma highlighted the lack of har-
monized legal regulation between Europe and the United States.
However, the impetus behind the legal debate that flared up after the
coming into force of the European Privacy Directive in 1997 is the per-
ception that the strong commitment to privacy in Europe, in particular,
(and even in the United States) is being eroded by the pressure toward
„openness“ pushed by the purveyors of direct marketing technologies.18
Though the technology of encryption, in particular, has enabled a grea-
ter degree of privacy than previously possible (e.g. the ubiquitous
spread of public key encryption and digital info-mediary agents), the
economics of Internet-business has thus far led to an increase in targeted
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marketing at the expense of personal privacy.   This trend may be just
that — a transitional period during the pioneering days of e-commerce -
which will have preceded a shift to enhanced privacy and the utililzati-
on of Privacy Enhancing Technologies (PETs) on every desktop.19
But the commercial developers of the Internet-based e-commerce
applications that drive growth on the Web have a clear goal: to sell pro-
duct.  The innovations in direct and targeted marketing made possible
by intelligent technologies that recognize users, record and then predict
their preferences create new opportunities for improved sales and mar-
keting, even as they transform users into consumers and consumers into
probabilities.  The fierce competition among e-businesses for consumer
eyeballs and loyalty increases the clamor for these tools to a fever pitch.
The desire to extract ever more information and data in order to predict
buying habits and thereby contribute to the growth of the New Economy
directly conflicts with traditional values of privacy and autonomy.
„Knowing your customer“ in order to anticipate and meet his or her
needs has always been an important pillar of salesmanship.  But with the
omnipotent knowledge enabled by the integration of databases of per-
sonal information (government records, credit card and employment
records, shopping information etc), a business that utilizes the right
technology can know more about me than I know about myself.  Because
the technology makes this so easy, it becomes increasingly difficult to
argue that it is inappropriate.  „Privacy is dead, get over it,“ infamously
exhorted Sun Microsystems President, Scott McNeely, emphasizing that
technology has created a paradigm shift, leading to the devaluation of
privacy as we have known it.   On-line industry lobbyists argue that self-
regulation and more time are required to adjust and find a balance bet-
ween the potential of e-commerce and the value of privacy in an on-line
world.  Civil libertarians and privacy advocates, by contrast, are pushing
for additional legislation and greater enforcement of that legislation in
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the on-line environment worldwide.  Whatever the eventual practical
outcome, the debate over technology’s impact on the right to and value
of privacy has just begun to rage.  The debate is paradigmatic of this per-
vasive perception that network technologies, which permit the rapid
integration of informational databases to create personal profiling, threa-
ten traditional values, especially in non-American cultures where the
historical experience with fascism and Nazism has inculcated a zealous
belief that the right to privacy is inviolable and sacred.
Private Technologies Not Public Democracy
The final assault we perceive on our democracy is the pervasive
absence in cyberspace of public spaces and public technologies.  There is
no equivalent to the public park or to the sidewalk in cyberspace where
citizens can happen upon a protest, a demonstration or a gathering.
Though there are governmental and civic Web sites and even citizen Free
Nets (publicly accessible computer systems), the decentralized and pri-
vatized architecture of the Net makes it difficult to find these places and
for them to achieve the critical mass of participants.  There are few town
halls or public meeting spaces.  Instead, a new culture of decentralized
and grassroots organizing is developing among a certain techno-elite.
But, for the majority of Internet users, their political experience on the
Net is largely passive.  They can obtain information and even govern-
mental services as consumers - now they can, in limited circumstances,
even vote — but rarely interact with each other as citizens.  The com-
munity-oriented focus of the Net has been supplanted by the dominan-
ce of a consumer culture.   Citizens spend more and more time on-line
and grow accustomed to the absence of public spaces.  Exacerbating the
problem is the fact that the vast and exponentially growing repository of
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free information available via the World Wide Web has necessitated the
reliance on filtering technologies that sort, find and manage information,
transforming it into useful knowledge rather than useless data.  In the
pessimistic view, these tools, however, are so effective that they allow us
to hone and personalize our media experience to create the „me chan-
nel,“ where I can get anything I want, anytime.  Interaction on the Net
becomes individual and personal yet there is no longer any commonly
shared media experience.  We enter into so-called communities with peo-
ple thousands of miles away and share files with music listeners on the
other side of the globe but become even more removed from neighbors
and friends.  It is still television - from the Olympics and the NBA
playoffs to the Princess Di Funeral and movies like Holocaust - that forge
a common cultural conversation.  Even Internet „happenings“ become
newsworthy because television reports on them.  But as television also
moves to the Web, we pick-and-choose our own media experience.  This
has the positive effect of decreasing reliance on a handful of centralized
broadcasters and their often mind-numbing programming choices, dum-
bed-down to please the lowest common denominator.  But substitutes
for that a new dependency on commercial filtering tools that sort and
favor content preferred by a handful of centralized Web site operators
and new media moguls.   Behind the rhetoric of personalization and
individualization is a dangerous delegation of choice to technologies
that are not accountable, not democratic and that we largely neither
understand nor control.
The qualitative nature of interaction on the Net is primarily me-
centric, dominated by the values of targeted marketing, rather than by
the motivations of politics, culture, education or other public activities.
No matter how great the potential for democratic improvement inherent
in these networks that connect people and their machines, they do not
promote the values of democracy unless they are expressly and explicit-
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ly used to that end.   The values of those writing code for e-commerce are
neither democratic nor political, nor do they have to be.  But there are
very important political consequences for our democracy from the fact
that, as a society, we spend more and more time in a world without
public spaces (or, as discussed briefly above, without genuine privacy or
private space).  Government has done little thus far to counterbalance
the rampant commercialism of the Net.  We have utterly failed to make
a commitment to make the Internet a place for democracy, a place for us,
as well as a place for commerce.20
The inadequacy of national legal systems to police the Internet, the
riding roughshod over cultural difference and the absence of public
space on the Net, all create the perception of a gradual onslaught against
democracy in those countries where Internet usage is prevalent.  The
appeal of the Internet among young people to the exclusion of their
elders and the rendering transparent of the failings of democratic insti-
tutions designed for a different technological reality heighten the threat.
This perception is as popular as the countervailing view that the Internet
is the greatest boon in the history of modern democracy for precisely the
same reasons: it undermines the police power of the centralized state,
represents a conduit for global civic dialogue and cooperation and allo-
ws every citizen to be his own broadcaster and operate a soap box via the
Web.  The reality is somewhere between these two extreme perceptions. 
Next Steps
The unique characteristics of the new Internet technologies, which
vastly exceed the potential for political change brought on by earlier
innovations, challenge the political system, regardless of nationality,
party or ideology.   They act as a mirror, exposing the inadequacy of our
19
current institutions that presuppose an outdated technological reality,
and create pressure on the system.   The outcome, impossible to predict
with any certainty in the midst of this cultural evolution, is unlikely to
be destructive of democracy.  Rather, the spread of Internet technologies
will change - perhaps for the better or not — the composition and cha-
racter of democratic political culture and its institutions.  Technology is
one of the determinants that shape our political culture because it defi-
nes the range of possibilities for how government communicates with its
citizens and how they communicate with each other.   There are techno-
logies now available that change the possibilities - positively and nega-
tively - for new forms, modes and speeds of conversation and therefore
are fundamentally changing the essence of democratic life.  If the
Internet can improve government’s ability to hear its citizens and for citi-
zens to form and express political opinions, its institutions must be res-
ponsive to these possibilities in order to remain democratic and legiti-
mate.  By the same token, if computer networks undermine the effec-
tiveness of our democratic institutions - and therefore their legitimacy —
these institutions have to adapt. It is not democracy itself that is at issue,
although that might eventually turn out to be the case, but the qualitati-
ve nature of that democracy in the near term.  Our laws and institutions
continue to survive the explosion of the Internet culture, but this tech-
nological shift increasingly eats away at their legitimacy.
When a social phenomenon, be it spread by the mass media or the
Internet, exposes the inadequacy and illegitimacy of our political cultu-
re, we have to recognize the challenge and respond, if that perception of
threat to our political culture and its institutions is not to become a dan-
ger to the survival of democracy itself.  That is to say, we have to begin
to make room in cyberspace for citizens as well as consumers and to
address the changes brought on by the Internet politically and democra-
tically.
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To respond to the jurisdictional dilemma, the conflict between glo-
bal technology and local values and the absence of public space on the
Net, we need to redefine our democratic processes - the means we think
of as legitimate - if we are to come up with democratically legitimate
ends rooted in the new technological reality.  Though the Internet is pro-
mising for its potential to be used to improve democracy, it is less the
nature of the technology itself that is ultimately determinative than
whether we think about this technology with civic and democratic,
instead of merely commercial, goals in mind.  „There is nothing wrong
with trying to make a profit by selling people what you guess they want,
but when the Net becomes primarily or exclusively commercial, our
capacity to choose is reduced to market appetites, and our potential for
participation and interaction is reduced to rudimentary clientelism.  In
other words, without public intervention, the „new“ Net technology
becomes very much like the older technologies: passive, commercial,
and monopolistic.“21 The Net may continue, as now, to coexist alongsi-
de our democratic political culture, putting it in a bad light, revealing its
inadequacies but having no substantial corrective impact.  On the other
hand, the technology, because it is a communications technology, can be
enlisted to improve the very flaws that it lays bare.  As we have already
discussed, however, because there is as much potential to use the Net for
anti-democratic or a-democratic purposes as for improving political cul-
ture, it must be a conscious and expressly political effort.
Therefore I want to conclude with a three-fold prescription for
improving the democratic quality of these technologies and using the
technology to improve, or even rescue, our democratic political culture
(and eventually our democracy) from the threat posed by the evolution
of networked communications technologies.
Get the values right.
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Get the rules right.
Get the architecture right.
To „get the values right“ means to start with the premise that
democracy is political and that we must approach the conundrums crea-
ted by technological change with an expressly political outlook and
approach, instead of abandoning ourselves to the ethic of the „code“ and
the values of the Net, which are commercial, private and privatizing.
Every technology prefers some set of values and no technology is ever
implemented in a purely neutral fashion.   We should not be abashed
about promoting democratic values. This means creating the incentives,
legal and otherwise, to keep the telecommunications infrastructure open
and accessible to all, regardless of whether it is copper or fiber optic
cable, terrestrial or satellite broadcasting, wireline or wireless telephony.
But there also needs to be software applications for democracy, civics
and education that can be used via these open conduits.  Finally, quali-
tative, independent and trustworthy content must complement and
populate the applications, if they are to be useful for democratic impro-
vement. 
To „get the rules right“ is to start establishing standards and prin-
ciples by which to institutionalize the democratic processes by which
decisions can be made in a wired world.  That is to say, we have to focus
first on creating democratically legitimate processes if we are to achieve
democratically legitimate ends.  This means using technology to
democratize and render more transparent and efficient our current insti-
tutions and to create new cyber-institutions that promote democracy
within the technology’s space.  This also means using technology to help
foster a critical, informed and deliberative public discourse.
Though democracy the world over has certain common features,
„democracy“ is not a monolithic notion but is conditioned by local cul-
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ture, history and values and comes in many different forms of democra-
tic political culture. If we focus on universalizing democratic rules of
decision-making, we can begin to address the global nature of the tech-
nology without prescribing uniform and therefore illegitimate ends for
different cultures.
Until recently, in Hong Kong, only businesses could register a
national domain name with the .hk suffix.  Individuals could not register
a domain and therefore could not establish personal Web sites except by
setting up a sub-page through a commercial provider.  That is the wrong
rule for creating an Internet that promotes free expression and
democracy.  Rules that prevent censorship or discrimination, either by
government or by the market, in access to or use of these communicati-
ons technologies are needed to set us along the right path.  It is still an
open discussion as to who should set these rules and how they are to be
administered.  Given the flexibility and power of the technology, many
rules can be more effectively self-enforced (e.g. filters) by individuals
with powerful software than by governmental policing.  But if we are to
begin to overcome the threat to democracy posed by technologies that
exceed national boundaries, we have to invent new processes by which
we network our institutions or create new ones to address these global
challenges.
„Getting the architecture right“ means building technologies that
promote the values of democratic culture.   The technology is eminently
flexible which means that different architectures can coexist that promo-
te the values of variants of democracy, including improved applications
for secure voting that enhance direct democracy on the Net and new
applications for deliberation and discussion that facilitate participatory
democracy.22 This can be achieved by a combination of public regulati-
on, public incentives to the private sector to promote public technologies
and purely private innovation that responds to the market demand for
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technologies that serve democratic, educational, cultural and civic ends.
Though the idea that technology is not going to usher in the
Messianic age of democracy or destroy the nation state as we know it, is
intuitively obvious, the conclusion that follows from it is not and bears
(over)-emphasizing.   We are conscious of and perceive the revolutionary
process of technological change going on around us but the real impact
this change will have on the qualitative nature of our political culture is
not predetermined.   To date, we sense the increasing illegitimacy of poli-
tical processes and institutions predicated on a different communicati-
ons infrastructure to meet the challenges of high-speed networked com-
munications.  But the next step is not de facto global government and the
overhaul of the ultimate structure of democratic governance, which
would just replicate old ways of doing and old flaws in our current
democratic systems on a bigger scale, but a rethinking of democratic pro-
cesses for the Internet era.   To be legitimate, our institutions must take
account of a communications landscape where each person can be his
own broadcaster and where citizens can cheaply and easily talk to one
another about issues of public import and concern.   They have to reco-
gnize the global flow of money and ideas without denigrating the local
quality of culture and values.  In other words, we have to use the Net as
a means to further democracy and use democracy and its values as tools
to make the Net a habitable terrain for citizens as well as consumers.
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